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politics of shale gas in the United Kingdom
Laurence Williams and Benjamin K. Sovacool
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
ABSTRACT
Drawing from an extensive content analysis of the UK parliamentary debate
over shale gas, we use the UK shale gas case to explore how energy democracy
themes are used and countered in the framing strategies of discourse coalitions
in national political sites. Furthermore, we explore the extent to which these
national political sites and discursive strategies are effective as institutions and
practices through which to achieve energy democracy. We achieve this through
an analysis of the success of the UK anti- and pro-shale gas development
discourse coalitions in recruiting national political figures and influencing think-
ing and decision-making in parliament. In doing so, we bring together the
literatures on discourse coalitions and energy democracy. We conclude with
implications for both national policy as well as critical inquiry into environmen-
tal politics.
KEYWORDS Energy democracy; shale gas; hydraulic fracturing; frames; discursive coalitions; party
politics
Introduction
In debates about participatory forms of energy decision-making, the recently
curtailed seven-year pursuit of shale gas in the United Kingdom perhaps
casts in doubt that advanced democracies will pursue democratic forms of
energy planning. Using hydraulic fracturing to exploit domestic shale gas
resources did not enjoy widespread general public support in the United
Kingdom (UK) (BEIS 2019). Furthermore, early exploratory sites provoked
local community opposition wherever proposed.
In spite of this public ambivalence, five successive UK governments
supported the establishment of a domestic shale gas industry until
a moratorium was announced due to persistent seismicity at the company
Cuadrilla’s Preston New Road (PNR) shale gas exploratory site (BEIS and the
Oil and Gas Authority 2019). Prior to this, UK governments had made
a number of changes to the planning system in order to help facilitate
development. In 2016, using recently established appeal recovery powers
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(DCLG 2015), the then Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government Sajid Javid granted planning permission to PNR, overturning
the initial decision to refuse permission by Lancashire Country Council
(LCC). More recently the government had consulted on now abandoned
proposals to treat shale production projects as Nationally Significant
Infrastructure Projects (NSIP) and non-fracking exploratory projects as
permitted development (BEIS 2018, Ministry of Housing, Communities
and Local Government 2018). It had been widely anticipated that these
reforms would limit the scope for local input in decision-making on shale
development (House of Commons Housing, Communities and Local
Government Select Committee 2018, CPRE 2018a). In fact, Matthew
Cotton has located recent planning reforms on shale development within
a broader trajectory of planning reform toward the greater streamlining and
centralisation of planning decision-making (Cotton 2017).
Drawing from an extensive content analysis of political testimony, we use
the UK shale gas case to explore how energy democracy themes are used and
countered in the framing strategies of discourse coalitions in national poli-
tical sites. Energy democracy, broadly speaking, is a movement and aim that
combines efforts towards decarbonisation of the energy system and sustain-
ability transitions more broadly with attempts to achieve more democratic
energy decision-making and greater community ownership of
a decentralised energy system. We also explore whether influencing thinking
and decision-making in national political sites can be an effective means of
pursuing energy democracy aims. In order to do so we assess energy democ-
racy in terms of the concept of the discourse coalition, because the energy
democracy literature lacks theorising about how change may be brought
about through conventional political institutions and practices.
Moreover, our analysis illustrates that the political parties involved in
shale gas debates are not monoliths and have many shifting characters and
agents with diffuse strategies, at times amounting to dissent within each
party. These various agents deploy energy democracy frames, alongside
others, in potentially instrumental ways.
Background: ‘bad gas governance’ and discourse coalition
membership in the UK shale development debate
Shale gas started to emerge as an issue in UK media and political discourse
after 2010 (Mazur 2016), although it was not until 2011 that the issue started
to gain a degree of public notoriety (see Figure 1).
By early 2014, criticisms about accountability, democracy and local com-
munity input in the governance of shale development had, according to one
study, become the dominant form of anti-shale development discourse in the
UK (Bomberg 2017). The subsequent planning reforms, overturned
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decisions, and further proposed reforms discussed above were only likely to
have exacerbated this in the period leading up to the recent moratorium,
placing energy democracy themes such as local community influence over
decision making at the heart of the issue (see Figure 2 for an example).
Responding to the granting of planning permission to the PNR site, Pat
Figure 1. The timeline of the emergence of shale gas as a public issue in the UK, 2010 to
2018.
Figure 2. Graffiti protesting against hydraulic fracturing on Crosse Hall Lane Bridge,
Lancashire, as seen from the M61 southbound near junction 8, 2018.
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Davies, the chair of local opposition group Preston New Road Action Group,
described the decision as ‘neither right, nor fair and not least, it is wholly
undemocratic’, whilst accusing the Government of a ‘callous disregard for
local planning’ and ‘dismantling the democratic process to facilitate a dirty
fossil fuel industry’ (Hayhurst 2016, p. no pagination). Furthermore, the
Campaign to Protect Rural England had described the proposed NSIP and
permitted development reforms as bypassing the rights of local communities
(CPRE 2018a), and as ’an unacceptable move that will undermine local
democracy and faith in the planning system’ (CPRE 2018b, p. no
pagination).
As already discussed, we are interested in both discourse coalition mem-
bership and the playing out of these energy democracy themes in the UK
parliament. The UK parliament consists of an elected lower house, the House
of Commons (HoC), and a largely appointed upper house, the House of
Lords (HoL). Parliament’s main functions are to scrutinise the government,
approve government spending, make and change laws, and debate the
important issues of the day. The political party that wins the most seats at
a general election forms the government; and government positions – cabi-
net ministers and junior ministers – are primarily filled by Members of
Parliament (MPs) from the governing party, with some positions filled by
members of the HoL. During our period of analysis (2010–2018) there were
five UK governments, most of which have been supportive of shale
development.1
Our assessment of the UK parliament as a potential site of energy democ-
racy is based on an analysis of discourse coalition membership within
parliament. A number of studies have analysed the discursive struggle over
shale gas in the UK (Cotton et al. 2014, Bomberg 2017, Stephan 2017, Nyberg
et al. 2018), as well as advocacy coalition membership (Cairney et al. 2016,
2018, Ingold et al. 2017). Bomberg (2017) and Cotton et al. (2014) yield the
most information regarding discourse coalition membership in the broader
UK shale gas debate (i.e. beyond our narrow focus on parliamentary debate);
they have identified a pro-shale gas coalition populated by the government
and much of the Conservative party alongside many geoscientists, oil and gas
firms, industry networks (e.g. the Institute of Directors), and parts of the
media (e.g. the Daily Telegraph) (Cotton et al. 2014, Bomberg 2017). The
anti-shale gas coalition has consisted of environmental NGOs, local protes-
tors and community members, the Green party, some Labour and
Conservative politicians (both local councillors and MPs in affected areas),
some experts, and some of the media (e.g. the Guardian) (Cotton et al. 2014,
Bomberg 2017).
We contribute to this literature by focusing specifically on the dynamics of
discourse coalition membership in Westminster. There has, to our knowl-
edge, been no systematic analysis of shale development discourse coalition
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membership amongst UK national political actors (government members,
MPs and members of the HoL). This focus should not be taken to downplay
the importance of actors and events in the broader discursive struggle
beyond parliament (e.g. the efforts of local community groups and NGOs);
rather the focus here is on the relative strength and achievements of these
broader coalitions within parliament over our timeframe.
Conceptual framework: energy democracy meets discourse
coalitions
As already discussed, we are interested in how energy democracy themes
figure in the framing strategies of shale development discourse coalitions at
Westminster and whether national sites and discursive action are effective
means through which to pursue energy democracy. This entails bringing
together two concepts – energy democracy and discourse coalitions.
Energy democracy
The notion of energy democracy largely grew out of grassroots activists and
NGOs in the United States and parts of Europe particularly around 2010
(van Veelen and van der Horst 2018). Although some consider it still an
under-defined concept (Szulecki 2018), it has recently attracted increasing
academic attention and critical engagement (see, for instance, Burke and
Stephens 2017, 2018, Szulecki 2018, van Veelen and van der Horst 2018, van
Veelen 2018). The energy democracy movement connects the current cen-
tralised, corporate, fossil-fuel dominated energy system with economic
inequality, social injustice and a democratic deficit in energy governance
(Burke and Stephens 2017), and identifies the transition towards a renewable
based energy system as an opportunity to transform economic and govern-
ance systems. This is partly a result of the material properties of renewable
energy – primarily its decentralised nature –which compared to fossil fuels is
arguably more conducive to radically different ways of organising social and
political life.
van Veelen and van der Horst (2018) argue that energy democracy can be
considered as both an outcome and a process: an idealised vision of the
future where, typically, energy systems are decentralised, collectively owned
and controlled, equitable, and socially and environmentally sustainable; and
the series of political struggles through which advocates attempt to bring this
future about (van Veelen and van der Horst 2018). As Angel (2016, p. 4) puts
it, energy democracy can be seen as ‘an abstract vision of a future energy
system’ or ‘an ongoing series of multiple struggles over who owns and
controls energy and how, where and for whom energy is produced and
consumed’. As van Veelen and van der Horst (2018) point out, process
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and outcome are often seen as linked, as participatory governance proce-
dures are frequency imagined to lead to more legitimate, fair and sustainable
outcomes.
The style of democracy underpinning the energy democracy vision of how
to choose, organise and run the energy system is primarily associative, with
secondary influences from deliberative and material democracy (van Veelen
and van der Horst 2018). In associative democracy ‘as many of the affairs of
society as possible are managed by voluntary and democratically self-
organising associations’ (Hirst 1994, p. 15). Deliberative democracy involves
inclusive and open deliberation in which all affected by a decision have the
opportunity to participate and through which consensus emerges around an
option whose consequences all can non-coercively accept (Habermas 1987,
1990, Dryzek 2000, Chambers 2003). Material democracy, finally, is con-
cerned with public access to and control over material resources (van Veelen
and van der Horst 2018), as well the role of objects in constituting publics
and forms of political participation (Marres 2012).
The energy democracy movement tends to privilege local scales, focusing
particularly on the community as an ideal social grouping of political action.
There is also a focus on particular forms of political action such as commu-
nity ownership and control of the means to produce and distribute energy.
These material forms of participation typically take precedence over more
conventional forms of political action. There are some exceptions to these
emphases. Weinrub (2014), for instance, argues for greater integration with
conventional forms of ‘institutional democracy’, whereas others focus on
conventional forms of political action such as voting, debating and partici-
pating in policy decisions (Farrell 2014, Kunze and Becker 2014, Vansintjan
2015, Weinrub and Giancatarino 2015).
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the energy democracy movement can
tend to neglect the political sites and institutions of constitutional-liberal
representative democracy and their relationship with the energy democracy
agenda. The policy pursued through these sites can help or hinder moves
toward greater energy democracy (e.g. Germany’s Energiewende).
Moreover, energy democracy has the potential to overlook conventional
and discursive forms of political action and their relationship with the
practices and forms of political action more readily associated with the
energy democracy agenda. Thus, the residents of the Sussex village of
Balcombe – the site of high-profile protests (see Figure 1) – started an energy
co-operative with the aim to produce 100% of the village’s electricity require-
ments (REPOWERBalcombe 2019). This clear example of energy democracy
emerged from a typical coalition of local residents and environmental acti-
vists opposing an oil exploration site through conventional activities such as
protest, legal challenge and opposition through the planning system. This
demonstrates the potentially fluid and dynamic relationship between
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discursive and material forms of political action, whereby groups may utilise
both simultaneously or one may lead to another. In short, groups working
towards greater energy democracy are likely to do so through a range of
activities, potentially including participating in public debate.
These potential blind spots of the energy democracy literature are of
course understandable given that energy democracy grew out of frustrations
with conventional institutions and practices of political action. Nonetheless,
our aim here is to explore the relationship between energy democracy and
these more conventional sites and forms of politics.
Frames and discourse coalitions
Our approach to discourse coalitions and the related notion of frames draws
on the work of Robert Entman and Maarten Hajer. For Entman (1993),
frames are essentially about selection and salience: framing is about what is
said and what is emphasised. Focusing on and foregrounding and back-
grounding particular aspects of an issue can promote a particular definition
of the problem, encourage particular interpretations and judgements, and
highlight and foreclose particular ways forward (Entman 1993). Various
different approaches are taken to the relationship between frames and
Hajer’s (1995) related notion of storylines (see, for example, Bomberg
2017, Stephan 2017 for two contrasting approaches). In our analysis how-
ever, we focus simply on the notions of frames and discourse coalitions,
following Stephan’s approach of treating frames and storylines as effectively
synonymous (Stephan 2017).
Frames are both the tools of discourse coalitions and the ‘discursive
cement’ that brings and keeps these coalitions together (Hajer 1995, p. 65).
Whilst framing might at times be tacit rather than strategic and intentional,
we view the type of speech analysed here (parliamentary discourse) as
typically intentional and in some cases carefully designed for a particular
instrumental purpose (e.g. the persuasion of an opponent, the undermining
of an opponent’s position, the persuasion or representation of a broader
public audience).
Discourse coalitions are networks of actors who group around particular
frames and ways of talking and thinking about environmental politics (Hajer
1995). The basis of these coalitions is language rather than necessarily shared
beliefs, identities or interests (Hajer 1995). This focus on language gives
discourse coalitions fluidity, dynamism and perhaps ephemerality, and, as
Cotton et al. (2014) point out, means that their membership often cuts across
traditional political boundaries (e.g. classes, traditional parties) and links
diverse actors together in perhaps surprising alliances. Hess (2019) argues
that the composition and goals of coalitions are not stable: different frames
may be used and emphasised across distinct coalition partners; and new
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frames may emerge in response to a change in coalition membership,
opposition counter-framing and broader institutional changes.
Hess examines discourse coalitions and their framing strategies in pursu-
ing the twin goal of a transition to a low-carbon electricity system and
political reform towards greater local, democratic control and ownership.
There is a dual relationship between discourse coalitions and energy democ-
racy: discourse coalitions utilise frames as part of the struggle towards greater
energy democracy (e.g. in order to become dominant in a discursive struggle,
influence decisions and recruit actors to their coalition); and energy democ-
racy themes may constitute part of the content of frames (e.g. frames con-
cerning decarbonisation and greater local control). In short, energy
democracy can figure as both the aim of coalitions and the content of frames.
Following Hess, we explore the role energy democracy themes play in the
content of the frames and framing strategies employed in the Westminster
shale gas debate, and assess whether the UK parliament is a promising site
through which discourse coalitions might achieve energy democracy aims.
Research design: an extensive content analysis of the UK
parliamentary debate
We document the discursive frames used about shale gas in national parlia-
mentary debate in Westminster over the timeframe of 01/01/10–30/06/18.
We selected this period on the basis of an analysis of the emergence of shale
gas and hydraulic fracturing as a political issue in the UK, triangulating
between academic literature, interviews conducted by the authors as part of
previous research, news coverage, and Hansard (the record of UK parlia-
mentary debate).
Using the keyword search terms ‘hydraulic fracturing’, ‘fracking’, ‘shale
gas’ and ‘unconventional gas’, we identified 1,297 relevant passages of par-
liamentary testimony. We downloaded, stored and analysed the passages
using NVivo 12 software. We developed initial themes through a review of
the existing literature and the initial stages of this analysis. We refined these
themes into a set of frames in an iterative fashion, with frames added or
refined in response to further analysis of the corpus (Mason 2002, Suddaby
2006, Urquhart 2013). Furthermore, we coded each source document by
time (quarter), and we coded each frame use by actor (individual politician),
party affiliation, and position within party (whether they held a government
or frontbench role or were on the backbenches).
Our analysis of coalition membership has two elements. First, we identify
the frequencies of pro- and anti-shale development frame use by political
parties, actor type (e.g. frontbench or backbench) and individual politicians.
Here we treat the use of pro- and anti-shale development frames as evidence
of discourse coalition membership. Whilst this is both in keeping with
8 L. WILLIAMS AND B. SOVACOOL
Hajer’s conceptualisation of discourse coalitions as being united by the
shared use of language and provides a useful sense of the general direction
of feeling on the matter within the different parties, it is admittedly
a relatively crude measure of coalition membership. For instance, it gives
little insight into the strength of an actor’s commitment to a coalition or their
importance, and classifies ambivalent actors who regularly use both pro and
anti frames as being part of both coalitions.
With this in mind, a second, qualitative element to the analysis charts the
key actors, activities, and achievements of both discourse coalitions within
parliament in order to contextualise the frame use frequencies. This second
element identifies the attempts that these coalitions make to institutionalise
their frames and materially influence policymaking.
The frames, membership and influence of shale discourse
coalitions in the UK parliament
Our analysis of parliamentary debate revealed nine key political frames, four
of which are pro-shale and five of which are anti-shale development. We
briefly summarise each key frame before the use of energy democracy themes
and coalition membership in Westminster are explored.
The key frames of the pro-shale coalition
The first pro-shale frame presents shale gas as low impact development in
terms of its impact on the landscape and character of rural places. The frame,
in short, argues that shale development will not industrialise the British
countryside. Whilst admitting that a level of disruption from traffic and
noise will be inevitable, the temporary and typical nature of these impacts
is stressed. Shale development is here framed as a very ordinary form of
industrial activity: its impacts no different from any construction project.
Furthermore, this frame envisages a UK shale gas industry with a small
surface footprint by fitting large numbers of wells onto a relatively small
number of well pads.
The second pro-shale frame presents shale gas as a lower carbon fuel, the
exploitation of which is compatible with the UK’s climate change targets
because it can be used as a ‘bridge’ in the transition to a low-carbon future.
This frame views shale gas as more environmentally friendly than coal, and
exploiting domestic resources as preferable to imports. It stresses the need
for gas for years to come, and as such the question becomes not whether we
use gas but where we getgas from.
The third pro-shale frame presents the risks of hydraulic fracturing to the
local environment and public health as manageable. This manageable risk
frame also expresses strong confidence in the robustness of the UK’s
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regulatory system and in the capacity and experience of the UK’s regulators.
It argues that near historical experience in parts of the US is not analogous
because of the superiority of the UK’s regulatory approach. Reference to
technical reports and the track-record of UK regulators in the North Sea
enhances the credibility of the frame. Finally, the frame stresses the estab-
lished nature of hydraulic fracturing globally, and shale development’s simi-
larity to conventional production more common in the UK.
The final pro-shale frame highlights the wealth and security benefits that
would arise from the development of a domestic UK shale gas industry.
Economic and energy security benefits tend to be spoken of together, and are
expressed through terms such as ‘home-grown energy’. The frame argues
that domestic supplies are inherently more secure than increasing reliance on
imports, and stresses the economic benefits of domestic energy production.
Both a new sense of abundance encouraged by some large resource estimates
(e.g. Andrews 2013) and competitiveness anxiety resulting from the re-
shoring of energy intensive industry back to the US in part thanks to the
US shale gas revolution underpin this frame.
The key frames of the anti-shale coalition
The first anti-shale development frame focuses on the fairness and inclusivity
of decision-making on shale gas, and the behaviour and trustworthiness of
governing institutions. The bad gas governance frame suggests that
a government willing to override local views and decisions is imposing
shale development on ‘by-passed’ communities. Reforms to the planning
system, which are seen as removing barriers to development at the expense of
local influence over decision-making, are highlighted. Finally, the frame
depicts government as ‘fast-tracking’ fracking and casts this apparent haste
as careless.
In a direct challenge to the lower carbon fuel frame, the second anti-shale
frame presents shale gas as a dirty fossil fuel and its exploitation as irreconcil-
able with UK climate change targets. It presents shale gas development as
more environmentally damaging than conventional oil and gas due to the
expectation of higher levels of fugitive emissions. The frame is sceptical
about the existence of carbon budget space for a domestic shale gas industry;
and is concerned about the fate of any displaced fuel, crowding-out invest-
ment in renewables and locking the UK into a fossil fuel energy system.
Finally, the frame presents the opening up of fossil fuel resources when
a large proportion of global proven reserves are ‘unburnable’ as deeply
misguided and irresponsible.
The third anti-shale development frame, the elusive threats frame, chal-
lenges the manageable risk frame’s depiction of the threat of hydraulic
fracturing to the local environment and public health. It presents the threats
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posed by hydraulic fracturing as elusive, insidious and uncertain. It plays up
the novelty of high volume hydraulic fracturing and views accidents and
surprises as inevitable. It also questions the adequacy of regulation and the
capacity of regulators, viewing the former as watered-down and the latter as
having been eroded by budget cuts.
The fourth anti-shale frame challenges the low impact development
frame’s depiction of a shale gas industry’s impact on the countryside. The
industrialise the countryside frame envisages a serious and transformative
impact on the British countryside. It argues that shale development is a more
intensive industrial process compared to conventional oil and gas develop-
ment due to high depletion rates (requiring the continuous drilling of new
wells) and higher volumes of flowback fluid (necessitating more HGV
movements).
Finally, the no repeat revolution frame is not necessarily anti-shale devel-
opment in principle but is sceptical about the prospect of a repeat of the US
shale gas revolution in the UK. The level of scepticism ranges from not
expecting to see a US-style impact on gas prices in the UK to doubting the
conditions exist for an industry of any significance to emerge at all. The
frame refers to a number of factors that make the UK less conducive to the
emergence of a shale gas industry compared to the US, including population
density, geological uncertainty and regulatory environment.
Energy democracy themes and the discursive contest over shale
development
Three of these frames in particular cover energy democracy-aligned themes –
the lower carbon fuel frame, the dirty fossil fuel frame and the bad gas
governance frame.
The lower carbon fuel frame demonstrates the institutionalisation of the
decarbonisation discourse associated with energy democracy within the
British political mainstream. Of course, activists and some experts (e.g.
Broderick et al. 2011, McGlade et al. 2016) have questioned this frame’s
claims about the relationship between the development of a domestic shale
gas industry and the UK’s emissions reduction targets. The point here is that
in order to be taken seriously the advocates of a new form of fossil fuel
development have to frame it as making a positive contribution toward the
aim of combating climate change and transitioning towards a low-carbon
energy system. The dirty fossil fuel frame demonstrates the difficulty that the
pro-shale development discourse coalition has had in attempting to expand
their appeal to those with strong environmental concerns.
The bad gas governance frame clearly criticises the governance of shale
development in the UK in ways that have parallels with the energy democ-
racy movement. Typically, what the frame envisages is greater local
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community influence and control over siting decisions, rather than the
community-run and owned renewable projects associated with energy
democracy. The pro-shale coalition’s response to this is a greater emphasis
on local community economic benefits as part of the wealth and security
frame. The industry body’s Community Engagement Charter (UKOOG
2013) and the Government’s Shale Wealth Fund (HM Treasury 2017) both
promise significant financial benefits to communities that host shale devel-
opment sites with community control about how proceeds are spent, though
they obviously fall well short of the co-operative ownership structures asso-
ciated with energy democracy.
In both cases, what is demonstrated is the difficulty in continuing to
promote a centralised, corporate, fossil fuel energy system in a society that
expects democratic decision-making and action on climate change. As
a fossil fuel, shale gas has been framed as a non-transition – as a short-
termist continuation of unsuitable practices, as avoiding difficult decisions
and changes, and as not in line with the urgently required rapid and deep
transition (Parkhill et al. 2013). Furthermore, it is a corporate-owned indus-
try, and government and industry have had to create the sense that local
communities have a stake and shared interest in seeing an industry emerge.
Finally, the bad gas governance frame makes clear an expectation of local
community influence over decision-making that is in tension with centra-
lised, large-scale infrastructure planning.
Frame use, dissent, and discourse coalition membership in Westminster
Table 1 summarises the use of the pro-shale frames by political party, whilst
Table 2 summarises anti-shale frame use. Following Hajer’s (1995) concep-
tualisation of discourse coalitions, we treat pro or anti frame use as evidence
of membership of the corresponding discourse coalition.
Table 1 demonstrates the Conservative party dominating the pro-shale
development coalition in Westminster during our timeframe of analysis. All
Conservative-led and Conservative governments within our timeframe were
key members of the pro-shale coalition. This is reflected in the fact that many
of the most prolific pro-frame users are Conservatives who have had relevant
government positions. These roles have involved them setting out, defending
and answering questions about government policy on shale. Key examples here
are Andrea Leadsom (as Minister of State for Energy and Secretary of State for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – 58 pro-frame uses), Michael Fallon (as
Minister of State for Energy – 53 pro-frame uses), and Baroness Verma (as
parliamentary under-secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change – 44
pro-frame uses).
There are also high levels of pro-coalitionmembership amongst Conservative
backbenchers, who are not compelled to support government policy, unlike those
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with roles in the government. Key examples include David Mowat (as MP for
Warrington South – 44 pro-frame uses), Tim Yeo (as MP for South Suffolk and
chair of the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee – 31 pro-frame uses)
and Kevin Hollinrake (MP for Thirsk and Malton – 27 pro-frame uses). During
the coalition government (2010–2015) a number of LiberalDemocrats (LD)were
also members of the pro-shale coalition. In particular, this included Ed Davey,
who as the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change was the most
prominent LD in a relevant government role. There was some pro-shale gas
frame use spread out across LD backbenchers during this period. As Figure 3
belowmakes clear, LDs inWestminster almost entirely abandoned the pro-shale
coalition after 2015.
Finally, some Labour parliamentarians have been members of the pro-
shale coalition. In particular, a group of MPs representing constituencies in
former industrial heartlands in the north of England were attracted by the
wealth and security frame and especially ideas around the role of shale gas in
boosting domestic energy-intensive industries. There were 55 uses of this
frame by Labour backbenchers in our corpus, by far the largest use of a pro-
shale development frame outside of the Conservative party. The most prolific
Labour backbench users of the wealth and security frame were Graham
Stringer (Brackley and Broughton, Greater Manchester), Angela Smith
(Penistone and Stocksbridge, South Yorkshire), Tom Blenkinsop
(Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland, North East England), and
Caroline Flint (Don Valley, South Yorkshire). These MPs all represent
Table 1. Use of pro-shale development frames by political party in the UK.
Political party
Low impact
development
Lower
carbon
fuel
Manageable
risk
Wealth
and
security
Total pro-shale
development
frame use
Conservative party 25 160 242 421 848
Government 7 67 172 221 467
Backbenchers 18 93 70 200 381
Labour party 2 18 22 62 104
Frontbench 0 7 6 7 20
Backbenchers 2 11 16 55 84
Liberal Democrat party 1 11 24 27 63
Government (2010–2015) 0 6 17 10 33
Non-government (backbench
or out of office)
1 5 7 17 30
Green party 0 0 0 0 0
Other Parties
Alliance 0 0 0 0 0
DUP 0 0 0 2 2
Cross-bench, independent,
non-affiliated,
0 8 5 5 18
Plaid Cymru 0 0 0 0 0
SNP 0 0 1 0 1
UKIP 0 0 0 1 1
UUP 0 0 0 1 1
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constituencies in the north of England, many of them either home to or near
steelworks or with a history of coal mining. In other words, these are
constituencies with industrial interests and heritage. These MPs were joined
by a small number of Labour peers.
The anti-shale development coalition had broader-based membership in
Westminster during our timeframe, with prominent members coming from
a wider range of parties. Having said this, as Table 2 demonstrates, the Labour
Party were the dominant force within the anti-shale coalition in Westminster
during the period of our analysis. Prominent Labour coalition members came
from both the front- and backbenches and included Alan Whitehead (MP for
Southampton Test – 37 anti-frame uses), Tom Greatrex (former shadow
Energy Minister – 35 anti-frame uses), Joan Walley (then MP for Stoke-on-
Trent North and former chair of the Environmental Audit Select Committee –
19 anti-frame uses), and Barbara Keeley (MP for Worsley and Eccles South –
18 anti-frame uses). In spite of having only one MP and one member of the
House of Lords, the Green Party was also a key part of the anti-shale coalition
in Westminster, and was particularly associated with the ‘bad gas governance’
and ‘dirty fossil fuel’ frames; Caroline Lucas MP and Baroness Jenny Jones of
Moulsecoombe were entirely consistent in using only anti-shale development
frames and were amongst the most prolific users of anti-shale development
frames in our sample (65 and 29 uses respectively).
Other prominent members of the anti-shale coalition had a range of
affiliations: Norman Baker (then LD MP for Lewes) and Baroness
Featherstone (former LD spokesperson for Energy and Climate Change);
Lord Wigley (Plaid Cymru); Lee Rowley (MP for North East Derbyshire,
Conservative); and the non-affiliated Lord Truscott.
Finally, Lee Rowley is the most prominent example of a significant group
of anti-shale gas frame users on the Conservative backbenches focused
particularly on the ‘bad gas governance’ and ‘industrialise the countryside’
frames. Other examples include Mark Menzies (MP for the Fylde), Anne
MacIntosh (originally MP for Thirsk and Malton, latterly Baroness
MacIntosh of Pickering), Kevin Hollinrake (MP for Thirsk and Malton),
and Eric Ollerenshaw (MP for Lancaster and Fleetwood). These MPs all
represent relatively rural constituencies containing or adjoining proposed or
actual shale gas exploration sites. This group of Conservatives, along with the
aforementioned pro-shale Labour MPs, is an important reminder of dissent
within the two main parties in the parliamentary politics of shale gas in
Westminster. In fact, with the exception of the Green Party, the prominent
parties in our corpus have all experienced significant dissent within their
ranks over their position on shale development.
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Coalition membership over time
An analysis of frame use over time gives a mixed picture as to relationship
between coalition membership and a party’s policy on shale gas. Whilst the
Conservative and Green parties were consistent in their official policies on
shale development within our timeframe (with the former always supportive
and the latter always opposing), both Labour and the LDs have gone through
shifts.
The LDs were in coalition with the Conservatives from 2010–2015, during
which time government policy was largely supportive of shale development
(notwithstanding a short moratorium 2011–2012). As Figure 3 demon-
strates, during this period enthusiasm for shale development initially
comes from LD MPs without a role in the government, with LDs in the
government only starting to voice support from late 2012. Anti-shale devel-
opment frame use from LDs without a role in the government also starts
slowly but picks up by the end of 2014. After the 2015 general election, when
the LDs left government, pro-shale development frame use almost entirely
stops, whilst anti-shale frame use continues to climb gently.
Figure 4 demonstrates that Labour frame use has had relatively little
relationship with Labour party policy. Their initial policy position of ‘cau-
tious and conditional’ support was announced in early 2012, although whilst
this policy was in place anti-shale development frame use in the Labour
outstripped pro-shale development frame use, including amongst the front-
bench. This policy of cautious support was based on the condition of strict
regulation, allowing Labour actors in our corpus to use anti-shale develop-
ment frames concerning the current inadequacy of regulation or the poor
governance of the Conservative party whilst still adhering to their policy.
Labour then shifted to a moratorium policy at the end of 2015 and then again
to a ban policy in September 2016. In spite of this official party opposition,
there have been a couple of subsequent jumps in backbench pro-shale
development frame use.
The key activities and achievements of the pro and anti-shale
development coalitions in Westminster
With the pro-shale development coalition having included most of the
governments in our timeframe, this coalition has clearly been more able to
institutionalise its frames in concrete decisions and policy action. Key early
successes included the recruitment of the then Conservative Chancellor of
the Exchequer George Osborne, who publicly threw his weight behind shale
in 2012, along with the then Conservative Prime Minster David Cameron in
2013. With the Conservative government strongly rhetorically committed,
the pro-shale coalition was able to materially influence policy in ways
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designed to facilitate the development of an industry. This included impor-
tant changes to taxation, subsurface access rights and planning, and the
introduction of a community benefit fund. Beyond supportive policy for-
mulation, another key Westminster activity is the production of select
committee reports. As Nyberg et al. (2018) point out, select committee
reports are a key means through which the pro-shale discourse coalition’s
frames in particular have ‘solidified’ through processes of certainty and
quantification. The HoL Economic Affairs Committee’s 2014 report is the
clearest pro-shale development example during our timeframe.
Whilst having a substantial presence in Westminster, the anti-shale dis-
course coalition never controlled the levers of power during our timeframe.
Nonetheless, it still had some success in materially influencing decisions over
the regulation of shale development at Westminster. Although a number of
representatives and other commentators accused the government of water-
ing them down (see Hayhurst 2015a), the anti-coalition did win a number of
concessions during the passing of the Infrastructure Act 2015. These
included conditions for fracking, such as baseline monitoring of methane
in groundwater and monitoring of methane emissions to air during opera-
tions, independent well inspections and banning fracking within ‘protected
groundwater source areas’ and within (though not necessarily under) ‘pro-
tected areas’ (Hayhurst 2015b, p. no pagination).
Alongside this degree of success in tightening the regulation of hydraulic
fracturing in the UK, the anti-coalition had some notable recruitment successes
over the course of our timeframe. The Labour Party, LDs and the Scottish
National Party all shifted to more hostile policy positions. Perhaps just as
importantly a small number of Conservative MPs became increasingly willing
to criticise shale development on the grounds of rural industrialisation and the
undermining of local democracy. Key figures here include Lee Rowley – who
chairs the sceptical All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Impact of Shale Gas –
as well as a number of MPs who, whilst not necessarily anti-fracking, strongly
oppose the NSIP and permitted development proposals.
Finally, select committees are also important vehicles for the anti-fracking
coalition. The key example in our timeframe is the Environmental Audit
Committee’s 2015 report which called for a moratorium.
Discussion: achieving energy democracy through national
political sites and discursive action
If we view the emergence of a UK shale gas industry as running counter to the
aims of energy democracy, our analysis demonstrates that during the period
2010–2018 the anti-shale coalition had limited success in achieving energy
democracy through the UK parliament. Most obviously, government policy
remained strongly supportive of a domestic industry throughout our time period
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 19
and efforts to impose a moratorium or ban failed. Furthermore, pro-shale
development frames were more widely used than anti-shale frames in the UK
parliament.
However, in spite of this, those pursuing energy democracy aims, such as
decarbonisation and greater local control over energy decision-making, have
some reasons for optimism. First, though large, the pro-shale coalition was not
broad-based. A few Labour backbenchers aside, it was based almost exclusively
in the Conservative party. The broader pro-shale discourse coalition had
relatively little success in appealing to actors beyond the Conservative party
within parliament, meaning that national political consensus in favour of shale
development was always somewhat shallow and fragile. The lower carbon fuel
frame in particular largely failed to entice environmentalists to back shale
development.
Whilst falling well short of the community ownership model favoured by
the energy democracy movement, the framing strategy of the anti-shale
coalition arguably forced the government and industry to shift their strategy
in order to, however unsuccessfully, create the sense that communities had
a shared stake and interest in shale development. The small pocket of
dissenting Conservatives, most of whom represented constituencies with
actual or proposed exploration sites, were crucial in pushing for this shift.
Just as our analysis timeline ended, there were signs that the number of
Conservatives using the ‘bad gas governance’ and ‘industrialise the country-
side’ frames was growing in response to the permitted development and
NSIP proposals (Gabbastiss 2018). Subsequently as part of withdrawing their
support for the industry, the government dropped these proposals.
One could simply see this subsequent shale policy U-turn as the govern-
ment keeping their promise – as a part of the manageable risk frame – to only
allow safe shale development. However, one could also see it as evidence that
the broader anti-shale development coalition – and especially local commu-
nities in Conservative constituencies via pressure on their MPs – had
increasingly gained the upper-hand in the discursive struggle and influenced
the government’s approach.
Conclusion
Our analysis of coalition membership and framing strategies in the
Westminster shale gas debate has identified the ways in which energy
democracy themes were used in the frames and counter-frames of both
coalitions, alongside other frames with even greater resonance. The ‘lower
carbon fuel’ frame was an attempt to align shale development with the energy
democracy aim of decarbonisation. Its very existence demonstrates the
institutionalisation of the decarbonisation agenda in British politics.
However, the ‘dirty fossil fuel’ counter-frame demonstrates that this
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‘bridging fuel’ argument had little resonance beyond the Conservative party.
As such, the pro-shale discourse coalition had relatively little success in
recruiting those with environmentalist concerns and lacked a broad-based
membership.
The ‘bad gas governance’ frame clearly raised energy democracy themes
such as local community participation in and control over energy decision-
making. Whilst it had some success in shifting the government and industry
toward trying to achieve a greater sense that communities had a stake or
interest in development, it still fell well short of the community ownership
models that the energy democracy movement envisages.
Our analysis of Westminster’s shale debate did identify some modest signs
of success for the anti-shale development discourse coalition during our time-
frame. The aforementioned institutionalisation of the decarbonisation agenda,
the shift toward a greater focus on community interests, the concessions over
regulation in the Infrastructure Act 2015, and increasing disquiet on the
Conservative backbenches regarding proposed planning reforms, all repre-
sented modest achievements for the anti-shale development coalition. These
examples suggested that, during our timeline, the anti-shale gas discourse
coalition did have some success in influencing thinking, shifting focus, and
affecting the conditions within which a shale industry would have to emerge.
In this modest way, the anti-shale development discourse coalition did have
some success in advancing energy democracy ideals through the UK parlia-
ment. This foreshadowed a more dramatic victory in the form of the recently
announced moratorium.
However, in spite of recent events, this case nonetheless also highlights some
difficult implications for the achievement of energy democracy ideals through
discursive struggles in a centralized and adversarial political system like the
UK’s. Most obviously, the pro-shale development coalition and pro-shale frame
use were dominant during our timeline, and for seven years government policy
continued to back the development of a domestic shale gas industry.
Furthermore, given that shale gas development proceeded over this period
in the UK expressly against the interests of some communities, and contrary
to some of the ideals of energy democracy, our case demonstrates some of the
imperatives likely to override energy democracy frames and the ideals on
which they are based. The prominence of the ‘wealth and security’ frame
points to the imperatives of growth and security, however the use of the
‘lower carbon fuel’ frame also suggests that the imperative of sustainability
may be mobilised against greater local control over energy choices.
Thus, in the end, frames and the party politics driving them become not only
about some narrow debate within a political system, or a way to aggregate the
preferences of constituents. We can also view them as a precursor of future
struggles over our low-carbon future, as a way of maintaining political power or
performing for a subset of political interests. In particular, the UK experience
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with shale gas during our timeframe demonstrates how a multitude of other
political issues, including industrial strategy, regulatory governance, and eco-
nomic development, can trump the importance of energy democracy as a frame.
Note
1. The first government in our time period – Gordon Brown’s Labour govern-
ment 2007–2010 – had no policy on shale development, which had not yet
fully emerged as an issue in the UK.
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